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COMMENTS
THE STANDARD OF CARE OF THE DRUGLESS HEALER
JOHN F. HANSLER

INTRODUCTION

T

HE PRACTITIONER of the healing arts who ministers to the sick and
afflicted without the use of drugs and surgery has long posed a
difficult regulatory problem to legislatures and to the courts. Though
battered by the invective of regular medicaP practitioners, drugless
healers continue to thrive in one form or another in most of the United
States. The most common classes of these healers are the osteopaths,
the chiropractors, the naturopaths, and the Christian Science practitioners. Osteopathy is licensed by statute in all of the states;' it is
'The terms "medical," "doctor of medicine," "doctor of medicine and surgery,"
"physician" and "physician and surgeon," as used in this article, pertain to regular
doctors having unlimited licenses to practice the healing arts; they are thus distin-

guished from "drugless healing" and "drugless healers," which pertain to a practice
limited to methods not involving the use of drugs, and perhaps limited in other respects.
The terms "healing" and "healers" pertain to practitioners of the healing arts in all
branches.
2 Heilman, Legal Control of Medical Charlatanism,22 N. C. L. REV. 25 (1943);
Comment, The Practice of the Healing Arts: Some Regulatory Problems, 6 FOEDHAM
L. REv. 444 (1937).
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the branch of drugless healing most like general medicine and surgery
in principles and techniques and is becoming in many respects a specialized branch of that practice.8 Chiropractic, licensed in nearly all

of the states,' has as its method the palpation and adjustment of the
spine as a cure of bodily ailments.' The general term "naturopathy"

embraces over sixty varieties of healing methods' and traces its lineage
to German healers of the last century who believed that nature and
natural agents-sunlight, water, air, etc.--were the greatest healing

agents.' This branch is recognized by statute in only a few states, one
of which is Washington. 8 Christian Science practitioners follow the
doctrine that the sick and afflicted may be returned to health by study,
faith, and prayer.' Since this branch of drugless healing has n certain

respects received legal treatment very different from that of the other
branches, 0 Christian Science should not, except where the text indicates otherwise, be considered as embraced in the general term "drugless healing" in the discussion that follows.
The drugless healer who treats a victim of appendicitis, diabetes, or

other serious disease, with disastrous results, raises this problem in the
consequent malpractice action: What is the standard of care by which

negligence is to be determined? Should it be the standard of the ordinary practitioner of the healing arts in all its branches? Should the
drugless healer for policy reasons be held to the relatively high stand-

ard of the general medical practice? Should the standard be limited
to that of his own branch of healing? Should it be varied according to
whether the human ailment treated is one which the drugless healer
"should" or "should not" treat, or according to the kind of treatment

8
Rmn, THz HEALiNG CULTS, pp. 11-17 (1932). In Washington the osteopath may
be licensed to practice surgery. Rxr. RFv. STAT. § 10056 et seq. [P.P.C. § 767-1
et seq.].
4Comment, op. cit., supra, note 2, at 445.
3 WBsTm's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2nd
Ed.61935). See Ram. REV. STAT. § 10101 [P.P.C. § 361-7].
Comment, op. cit., supra, note 2, at 446.
7
REED,
op. cit., supra, note 3, at 63.
8
Though the branch is not expressly named in the Washington drugless healing
statute, practitioners of naturopathy, called "sanipractors," have been licensed under its
broad provisions. See REm. REv. STAT. §§ 10114, 10122, 10123 [P.P.C. §§ 579-5, -23,
-25]. See text, infra. As of 1937, seven states licensed this branch of healing. Comment,
op. cit., supra, note 2, at 446.
9 See Glover v. Barker, 76 N. H. 393, 83 A. 916 (1912).
10 In most states, including Washington, Christian Science practitioners are excepted from the provisions of the statutes regulating the healing arts, presumably on
the ground that their practice is not purely "medicine" or "healing" and is protected
by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. Comment, op. cit., supra, note
2, at 446. See REm. REv. STAT. §§ 10024, 10071, 10091, 10109, 10118, 10120 [P.P.C.
§§ 734-43, 767-31, 360-37, 360-23, 517-15, 517-191.
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administered by the drugless healer? This problem is generally left to
the courts.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the impact of the recent
cases of Kelly v. Carroll1 and Carney v. Lydon 2 on the Washington
law concerning this problem. The article has been limited to a discussion of standard of care and is not intended to cover the broader
subject of the drugless healer's liability for malpractice in general."
Nor is it concerned with the relative merits of the various branches of
the healing arts. 4
As a background, a preliminary discussion of the general law on
the standard of care of the drugless healer, including the Washington
law prior to the cases mentioned, will be helpful.
Tm RuLEs oN STAnDARD oF CAE

The "Recognized" and "Nonrecognized" Branches of Drugless
Healing. The drugless healing arts, for the purpose of stating the rules
on standard of care, may be divided into those branches given recognition by the courts as established "schools of healing" and those which
are not so recognized. The standard of care of the member of a nonrecognized branch is simple and well settled. When such a healer holds
himself out as qualified to treat human ailments, he is held to the
standard of care of the reasonably skilled and trained practitioner of
general medicine and surgery in the vicinity." Since the standard of
care for members of recognized branches is quite different, it becomes
important to determine the criteria for recognition or nonrecognition.
If a statute authorizes members of a particular branch of the healing
arts to practice, such legislative recognition of the line of practice as an
established school of healing is obviously conclusive on the courts.
Absent express statutory authorization, or express or implied prohibition, the line of practice-will be recognized as an established school of
healing if it is governed by formulated rules for treating diseases and
injuries, i.e., established principles of practice for the guidance of its
members concerning methods, diagnosis, and remedies, which each
"I 36 Wn. 2nd 482, 219 P. 2nd 79 (1950).
12 36 Wn. 2nd 878, 220 P. 2nd 894 (1950).
13 On the general problem, see Comment, Liability of the Drugless Healer for Malpractice, 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 685 (1951).
14 On this question see the materials cited supra, note 2; FISHBEIN, FADS AND
QUACKERY IN HEALING (1932) ; REED, op. cit., supra, note 3.
' 5 Hanson v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 Pac. 282 (1920) ; Longan v. Weltmer, et al.,

180 Mo. 322, 79 S.W. 655 (1904); Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228
(1888) ; PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW or TORTS, p. 238 (1941).
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member is supposed to observe.16 Thus, recognition as a member of an
established school of healing is not accorded a "clairvoyant physician,"
whose treatment consists of going into a trance and who adverts to no
body of learning in his practice; nor to a Chinese herb doctor of the
"generation school," claiming to have inherited the practice from his
grandfather;"5 nor to a "magnetic healer," who purports to treat and
cure all diseases of the human mind and body through some power
possessed uniquely by himself."9
However, at least one court has held that if the branch is so widely
known, established, and patronized that it contains no elements of
deception to the public, and the persons seeking such line of practice
would ordinarily know just what knowledge they would find and what
treatment they would get, the healing method will be accorded recognition, notwithstanding its failure to fulfill the other requirements of
an established school. 0
While chiropractic 2 and Christian Science2 have been accorded
recognition by the courts in the absence of statutory authorization, no
court has considered the problem with reference to the naturopathic
school. This inquiry is not relevant to osfeopathy, which is everywhere
licensed under statute. 3
The "School of Healing" Rule on Standard of Care. Having noted
the distinction between the "nonrecognized" and "recognized"
branches of drugless healing, the standard of care to which members of
the latter are held in malpractice cases remains to be considered. The
standard of care of the doctor of medicine and surgery will first be
discussed, since it was in connection with this largest branch of the
recognized healing arts that the rules were developed.
The general rule in negligence cases is that a business or calling will
not be permitted to fix its own standard of care. In the usual case, the
standard is that of the reasonably prudent man under the circumstances, though compliance with the usual and customary practice 'in
the calling raises an inference of fact, not conclusive, that this general
'8 Nelson v. Harrington, supra, note 15.
Id.
"8 Hanson v. Pock, 57 Mont. 51, 187 Pac. 282 (1920).
2100 Longan v. Weltmer, et al., 180 Mo. 322, 79 S.W. 655 (1904).
Spead v. Tomlinson, 73 N. H. 46, 59 A. 376, 68 L- R. A. 432 (1904) (Christian
Science
practitioner).
21
Willett v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St 285; cf. State v. Fite, 29 Idaho 463, 159 Pac.
118322 (1916).
Spead v. Tomlinson, supra, note 20.
17

23 See note 2, supra.
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standard of reasonableness was attained.2 4 Doctors of medicine and
surgery have been excepted from this rule. Where a defendant doctor
has followed the customary and usual practice of his profession, with
the skill and diligence of the ordinary practitioner practicing in the
same or similar communities, he will not be held liable for malpractice.2" The reason given for this exception is that the complex and
highly specialized nature of the medical practice places it beyond the
understanding of a jury of laymen. Thus the verdict on the issue of
negligence must be based upon medical opinion and the medical standard of reasonableness.' Having thus allowed the medical practice
to fix its own standard of care, the courts have still further limited that
standard to that of the defendant doctor's own particular school or
system of practice within the general medical profession."r This rule
operates to confine the scope of inquiry to the principlesand standards
of a single school.
The rules governing the relation of the regular doctor of medicine
to his patient also govern the relation of the drugless healer of a recog24The T. J. Hooper, 60 F. 2d 737 (C.C. 2d 1932) ; Marsh Wood Products Co. v.
Babcock and Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932) ; PROSSER, op. Cit., supra,
note2515, at pp. 239-240.
Yeager v. Dunnavan, 26 Wn. 2d 559, 174 Pac. 755 (1946) ; Kemp v. McGillivray,
129 Wash. 592, 225 Pac. 631 (1924) ; see, e.g., Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wn. 2d 14, 17,
163 P. 2d 148, 150 (1948) ; Peterson v. Hunt, 197 Wash. 255, 257, 84 P. 2d 999, 1000
(1938); PROSSER, op. cit., supra,note 15, at p. 241 ; 3 SHEARMAN AND REMFIELD, NmLIGENCE § 614 (rev. ed. 1941). This rule is not applicable when the circumstances are
such that it is obvious to a layman that the practitioner was negligent and that his
negligence produced the injury; in such a case expert opinion is unnecessary, and a
defendant healer may he found negligent by applying the standard of the "reasonably
prudent man." Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235 (1913) (metallic
spring left in body of patient after operation) ; Peterson v. Hunt, 197 Wash. 255, 84
P. 2d 999 (1938) (failure to test for pregnancy when suspected) ; Davis v. Kerr, 239
Pa. 351, 86 A. 1007, 46 L.R.A. 611 (1913) (gauze left in patient after operation) ; cf.
Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489, 68 P. 2d 1034 (1937) ; Sawdey v. Spokane Falls and
Northern R. Co., 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972 (1902) ; PROSSa, op. Cit., Jupra, note 15,
at 241.
A specialist is required to have and to use greater skill and knowledge in his particular field than the general practitioner. Atkins v. Clein, 3 Wn. 2d 168, 100 P. 2d 1
(1940) ; Malila v. Meacham, 187 Ore. 330, 211 P. 2d 747 (1950) ; Beadle v. Paine, 46
Ore. 424, 80 Pac. 903 (1905); Ronn v. Twitchell, 82 Vt. 79, 71 A. 1045 (1909);
Blankenship v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 26 Tenn. App. 138, 168 S.W. 2d 491 (1942).
26 Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442, 444 (S.D. Ohio 1897) ; see Fritz v. Horsfall, 24
Wn. 2d 14, 18, 163 P. 2d 148, 150-151 (1940) ; Hill v. Parker, 12 Wn. 2d 518, 529, 122
P. 2d 476, 482 (1942).
2±Van Sickle v. Doolittle, 184 Iowa 885, 169 N.W. 141 (1918); Ennis v. Banks,
95 Wash. 513, 164 Pac. 58 (1917); Bush et ux. v. Kress, 181 Minn. 590, 233 N.W. 317
(1930); McCandles v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261 (1853); see, e.g., James v. Grigsby, 114
Kans. 627, 631, 220 Pac. 267, 269 (1923) ; Johnson v. Colp, 211 Minn. 245, 247, 300
N.W. 791, 792 (1941); Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N. Y. 201, 209, 49 N.E. 760, 762
(1898) ; Bowles et al. v. Bourdon et al., 147 Tex. 608, 219 S.W. 2d 779, 782 (1949) ;
McHugh v. Audet, 72 Fed. Supp. 394, 399 (M.D. Pa. 1947) ; Comment, Civil Liability
for Unintended Consequences, 186 MINN. L. REv. 188-189 (1951) ; 3 WHARTON AND
STILLE'S, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, § 473 (5th ed. 1905).

THE STANDARD OF CARE OF THE DRUGLESS HEALER

43

nized school to his patients.28 Thus, a drugless healer of a recognized
school is required to use only that degree of diligence and skill which
the reasonably skilled and trained practitioner of his own schzool of
healing would exercise under like or similar circumstances, in the same
or similar communities, having due regard to the advanced state of the
healing art at the time.29 Under this rule practitioners of different
schools of healing, such as schools of medicine and surgery, are incom-

petent to give testimony as to the propriety of the acts of a defendant
drugless healer in a malpractice suit." This rule, for convenience, will

be hereafter referred to as the "school of healing" rule.
The meaning of "school of healing" as used in this rule is important
in determining in any given case whether the defendant healer is to be

held to the standard of the average or ordinary member of a very large
group, such as all practitioners of the healing arts, or the entire medical profession, or all drugless healers, or to the more limited standard
of a particular group within the broader class. A wide range for differ28 Bakewell v. Kahle ....... Mont ....... 232 P. Zd 127, 129 (1951) (chiropractors) ;
Simms v. Gaffney, 227 S.W. 2d 848, 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) (osteopaths) ; Brooks
v. Herd, 144 Wash. 173, 176, 257 Pac. 238, 239 (1925) (mechano-therapist).
29 Simms v. Gaffney, 227 S.W. 2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Nelson v. Dahli, 174
Minn. 574, 219 N.W. 941 (1928) ; Bowman v. Woods, 1 G. Greene 441 (Iowa 1848) ;
Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936) ; Corey v. Radabaugh, 143 Wash.
653,8 255 Pac. 1037 (1927).
oWillett v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E. 2d 457 (1938) ; Nelson v. Dahli,
174 Minn. 574, 219 N.W. 941 (1928) ; Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114
(1905) ; Corey v. Radabaugh, 143 Wash. 563, 255 Pac. 1037 (1927).
It has been held error in Washington to instruct a jury that the standard of care
of a defendant drugless healer was dependent upon the advanced state of knowledge of
his branch of healing, when no evidence of any advancements in the practice as regards
the human ailment in question was presented at the trial. Corey v. Radabaugh, supra.
If admitted, the opinions of practitioners of other schools are not considered relevant on the question of negligence. See Simms v. Gafney, 227 S.W. 2d 848 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950); Benz v. Levin, 62 York 149 (C.P. Pa. 1949); Floyd v. Michie, 11 S.W.
2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
In Ellenwood v. McCoy et al., 8 Cal. App. 590, 47 P. 2d 796, 797 (1935), it was
said that expert testimony must come from members of a defendant chiropractor's
own school only when the inquiry concerns a special course of treatment of that school,
and that as to other matters, common to all healers, physicians would be permitted to
testify. But the rule has not generally been so limited, the courts recognizing that the
skill and knowledge of the schools of medicine and the schools limited in the scope of
their practice differ not only in kind, but in degree. Thus in Benz v. Levin, supra, it
was held that the testimony of a general practitioner of medicine could not be considered relevant on the question of the propriety of the acts of a defendant chiropodist,
who failed to recognize the danger of operating on a patient with diabetes without
taking great precautions against infection. There was no difference between the principles of the defendant's school and the schools of medicine in this regard. The issue,
strictly speaking, was not as to the propriety of a method of treatment, but rather the
quantum of knowledge which should be required of the defendant. The court held that
the standard of the defendant's own school was applicable, since the knowledge of the
two schools differed not only in kind but in degree. As to the rule applicable when the
courts find that the standards of the two schools are the same in reference both to kind
and degree of skill and knowledge, see text, infra.
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ence of opinion as to methods and techniques of treatment exists
within any one "school of healing." The courts do not recognize healers
as belonging to a distinct "school" merely because they follow a
method of treatment for one or more of the human ailments which is
different from that followed by other practitioners. This proposition is
not contradicted, but is emphasized by the rule, generally invoked in
malpractice cases involving physicians and surgeons, that when the
physician follows a method of treatment approved by a considerable
number of physicians in good standing in the community, he will not
be held liable because he did not use another and more effective
method."' This rule is not concerned with "schools of healing" as that
phrase is used in the "school of healing" rule. It in no way limits the
inquiry to the standards and principles of doctors following one method
of treatment. The propriety of the defendant's treatment is in issue,
and the testimony of physicians adhering to that and other methods is
admitted so that this issue may be resolved. 2 It is not a rule on standard of care at all, but an application of the "school" standard, stating
that the standard of the "school" has been attained, as a matter of
law, when one of several recognized methods of treatment has been
followed. It involves a recognition that within a single "school of healing" there may be several "proper" methods of treatment. 3
Although there has been little discussion of the question by the
courts, the results of the cases indicate that there are two criteria for
3' Holton v. Burton, 197 Wis. 405, 222 N.W. 225 (1928) ; Jackson v. Burton, 226
Ala. 483, 147 So. 414 (1933) ; McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Pa. 1947) ;
McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929) ; Maxwell v. Howell, 114 W. Va.
771, 174 S.E. 553 (1934) ; Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa. Super. 192, 163 A. 341 (1932) ;
Blankenship v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 26 Tenn. App. 1382, 168 S.W. 2d 491
(1942) ; Lorenz v. Booth, 84 Wash. 550, 147 Pac. 31 (1915) ; see Warwick v. Biles,
46 S. D. 622, 195 N.W. 501, 504 (1923) ; Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E. 2d 285,
288 (1940) ; Owens v. McLeary, 313 Mo. 213, 281 S.W. 682, 685 (1926) ; McPeak v.
Vanderbilt University Hospital, 33 Tenn. App. 76, 229 S.W. 2d 150, 151, 152 (1950) ;
Duckworth v. Bennett, 320 Pa. 47, 181 A. 558, 559 (1935) ; Howatt v. Cartwright, 128
Wash. 343, 345, 222 Pac. 496, 497 (1924) ; Gruginski v. Lane, 177 Wash. 121, 124, 30
P. 2d 970, 971 (1934).
32 See Maxwell v. Howell and McHugh v. Audet, note 31, supra.
In the McHugh case, supra, at 399, and in Reed. v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E. 2d
285 at 288 and Moscicki v. Shor, 107 Pa. Super. 192, 163 A. 341 at 343, the courts, in
speaking of the rule that a doctor may without liability use one of two or more recognized methods of treatment, used the term "school" in referring to the medical opinion
in favor of the defendant doctors' methods of treatment. Whatever the terms used,
however, the rule applied is as outlined in the text, and the term is thus not used in the
same sense as in the "school of healing" rule.
33 "Physicians and surgeons must be allowed a wide range in the exercise of their
discretion. The science of medicine is not an exact science. Therefore, as long as there
is room for an honest difference of opinion among competent physicians, a physician
who uses his own best judgment cannot be convicted of negligence, even though it may
afterward develop that he was mistaken." McPeak v. Vanderbilt University Hospital,
33 Tenn. App. 76, 229 S.W. 2d 150, 152 (1950).
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recognition of a particular group of healers as belonging to a distinct
school of healing: (1) Healers belong to a distinct school if their
standards, doctrines, and principles-the basic premises of their practice, as distinguished from mere choice of methods or techniques in
particular cases-are different from those adhered to by other healers
within the broader class." This would seem to be the basis for the
application of the rule as between allopathic and homeopathic doctors, both of whom were licensed practitioners of general medicine
and surgery." (2) When the statutes of the jurisdiction deal separately with two or more groups practicing the healing arts, and by
reason of statutory regulation the permissible scope of practice of the
respective groups differ, then such groups will be recognized as belonging to distinct "schools of healing." This would seem to be the reason
for applying the "school of healing" standard as between M.D.'s and
dentists," optometrists,"7 or chiropodists35 On the basis of one or both
of the criteria discussed, the "school" standard has been applied to
the several recognized schools of drugless healing-osteopaths,"9 chiropractors,4 0 naturopaths,11 Christian Science practitioners,"2 and a
84 In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P. 2d 654, 658 (1937), the following
definition of "school of healing" as used in the "school" standard is given: ". . . the
standards, doctrines, or principles relating to a profession or occupation in a given
locality.... The standardsor theories relating to the pathology, etiology, or treatment
of human ailments." (Italics supplied.)
35 Van Sickle v. Doolittle, 184 Iowa 885, 169 N.W. 141 (1918) ; Ennis v. Banks, 95
Wash. 513, 164 Pac. 58 (1917). The allopaths and homeopaths differ in the fundamentals of their respective approaches to the art of healing. The allopaths believe that
disease is combated by remedies producing effects in the human body different from
those produced by the disease treated; the homeopaths hold that disease is cured by
remedies that would produce in a healthy person the same effects as are produced by
the disease in the patient treated. WnsTma's NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1935). The struggle between the allopaths and the homeopaths has virtually ceased, with the allopaths winning out. Caldwell, Early Legislation
Regulating the Practiceof Medicine, 18 ILL. L. Rav. 225 (1940), at p. 239 et seq.
S6 Nelson v. Sandell, 202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1926) ; see Hill v. Parker, 12
Wn. 2d 518, 529, 122 P. 2d 476, 482 (1942). Another rationale for applying the "school"
standard to the dentist, however, is that dentistry involves distinct methods and skills
concerning which the testimony of practitioners of medicine or other branches of healing 3would be incompetent. See Nelson v. Sandell, supra, at 209 N.W. 444.
7 Hampton v. Brackin's Jewelry and Optical Co., Inc., 237 Ala. 212, 186 So. 173
(1939).
88 Benz v. Levin, 62 York 149 (C.P. Pa. 1949).
80 State v. Smith, 25 Idaho 541, 138 Pac. 1107 (1914) ; Simms v. Gafney, 227 S.W.
2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905) ;
Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 263 Pac. 26, 56 A.L.R. 814 (1928) ; Cayton v. English,
23 F. 2d (App. D.C. 1927) ; Wilkins v. Brock, et al., 81 Vt.332, 70 A. 572 (1908).
40 Howe et ux. v. McCoy, 113 Cal. App. 468, 298 Pac. 530 (1931) ; Nelson v. Dahl,
174 Minn. 574, 219 N.W. 941 (1928) ; Willett v. Rowekarnp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.
2d 457 (1938) ; Witt v. Reed, 144 Okla. 120, 289 Pac. 291 (1930).
"1 Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N. C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936) ; Corey v. Radabaugh, 143
Wash. 653, 255 Pac. 1037 (1927).
42 Spead v. Tomlinson, 73 N. H. 46, 59 A. 376, 68 L.R.A. 432 (1904).
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"botanic physician."4
The rationale of the courts in holding the healer only to the standard
of care of the practitioner of his own school is that it is unfair to test
whether a particular treatment is skillful by one who follows the
teaching of another system." "If the law permits a school of healing
for treating human ailments to flourish, it can only require those who
belong to it to use the techniques of that school as skillfully as the
average practitioner of such school performs it." 5 The rule also
appears to be based on considerations of expediency:
In view of the facts that different schools often employ radically different
methods of treating the same disease, that the practice followed in one
school would often be strong evidence of negligence, if resorted to by a
member of another school, .

.

. the extreme difficulty of ascertaining the

average skill possessed by all physicians is apparent.46

In the case of Brooks v. Herd," the Washington Supreme Court
stated that the same rules governing the relation of the regular doctor
of medicine to his patient also govern the relation of the drugless
healer of a recognized school to his patient. And in Ennis v. Banks,"8
in which a homeopathic physician testified as to the propriety of the
method of treatment used by the defendant, an allopath, the Court
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground, inter alia, that the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury that the standard of care
to be applied was that of "other physicians in good standing." The
court said: "Each school of medicine is entitled to practice in its own
way, and because one does not use the methods of the other is no
reason for holding the one for malpractice."4 The rule was followed
in Corey v. Radabaugh, ° where a drugless healer was charged in a
malpractice action with negligent treatment of the plaintiff for ulcer
of the cornea of the eye. The trial court permitted a doctor of medicine
to testify as to the correctness of the defendant's treatment. The Court
held this was error and reversed a judgment for the plaintiff. The
standard of care for the drugless healer was held to be that of those
reasonably skilled, practicing in the same neighborhood and in "the
43 Bowman v. Woods, I G. Greene 441 (Iowa 1848).
44 Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159, 161 (1925).
45 Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P. 2d 654, 671 (1937).
40 McBride v. Huskins, 76 N. H. 206, 81 A. 528, 529 (1911).
47 144 Wash. 173, 176, 257 Pac. 238, 239 (1927).
48 95 Wash. 513, 164 Pac. 58 (1917).
49 Id. at 519, 164 Pac. at 60.
60 143 Wash. 653, 255 Pac. 1037 (1927).
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same line of practice." This rule was restated in Wilcox v. Carroll,5
a wrongful death case involving a "sanipractor" (one of the naturopaths) who gave allegedly improper treatment for appendicitis.
An obvious corollary of the "school of healing" doctrine is the rule
that, in calling a drugless healer, the patient is presumed to elect that
the treatment shall be according to the system or school of healing to
which such healer belongs, and cannot be heard to complain that a
method of treatment appropriate to another school is not given or
8 the Washington court thus stated the
advised.2 In Wilcox v. Carroll,"
rule:
Of course, it must be admitted that, when respondent employed appellant
to doctor her child, she knew that he belonged to the drugless school of
healing which would not operate. She cannot be heard to complain because
an operation was not performed or advised by the appellant. She cannot
employ a doctor whom she knows will not operate and then recover damages because an operation was not performed."4
Situations in which the "School of Healing" Rule Is Not Applicable. In certain types of malpractice cases the reason for application of the "school of healing" standard is not present. Thus, when
the methods, principles and standards of the defendant's school of
healing are the same as those of another school in regard to the treatment or diagnosis which is in issue, the defendant is properly held to
the standard of either school.5 This rule has at times been misleadingly stated as permitting the application of the standard of care of
either or both of two distinct schools of healing when, in the judgment
of the court, the principles of the two systems do or should concur.5 '
Such a statement creates the impression that there are certain aspects
of healing for which an absolute standard of care is laid down by the
a'127 Wash. 1, 12, 219 Pac. 34, 38 (1923). In this case, the testimony of doctors of
medicine and surgery was admitted against the defendant sanipractor on the ground
that they had first-hand knowledge of the condition of the patient after the defendant's
treatment. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed on the ground that the
evidence showed the defendant negligent by the standards of his own school. See also
Sears v. Lydon, 169 Wash. 92, 99, 13 P. 2d 475, 477 (1932).
52 Van Sickle v. Doolittle, 184 Iowa 885, 169 N.W. 141 (1918) ; Nelson v. Dahl, 174
Minn. 574, 219 N.W. 941 (1928) ; Willett v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E. 2d
457 (1938) ; Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788 (1936).
53 127 Wash. 1, 219 Pac. 34 (1923).
5
4 Idem, at 6, 219 Pac. at 36.
5
1E.g., Swanson v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170 Pac. 135 (1918) ; Sinclair v. Haven,
198 Wash. 651, 89 P. 2d 820 (1939); Manos v. James, 7 Wn. 2d 695, 110 P. 2d 887
(1941); Sears v. Lydon, 169 Wash. 92, 13 P. 2d 475 (1932), Mann v. Grim-Smith
Hospital and Clinic, 347 Mo. 348, 147 S.W. 2d 606 (1941) ; Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb.
769, 238 N.W. 529 (1931) ; Hunter v. Hommel, 213 Cal. 677, 3 P. 2d 554 (1931) ; cf.
Klodek
v. May Creek Logging Co., 71 Wash. 573, 129 Pac. 99 (1913).
50
PRossEI, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS,

p. 238 (1941).
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courts, regardless of the school of the defendant. An examination of
the cases, however, reveals that the rule is limited in its application
to situations in which the principles of the two schools do in fact concur, or where the issue, because of the subject matter involved, cannot
logically admit of a division of opinion along "school of healing" lines.
An example of the latter situation is the case of Wemmett v. Mount,"8
in which the defendant physician was charged with burning a patient
by negligent use of a diathermy machine. A chiropractor skilled in the
use of the machine was permitted to testify as to the propriety of the
defendant's method of using it, the court saying that as to matters on
which the principles of the school of the defendant and that of the
witness do or should concur, the testimony of the witness was admissible. It would seem that in such a case there could be no division of
opinion on the issue along "school of healing" lines, since the machine,
its uses, and its dangers are the same whatever the school of the one
who employs it. There is also some language in the cases that the
"school of healing" rule is inapplicable in a case in which the issue is
the propriety of the defendant's diagnosis, for the reason that the
symptoms of human ailments and methods for detecting them are the
same in all schools of healing."9
If the drugless healer holds himself out as a doctor of medicine, he
will be held to the standard of care of such practitioner."0 Similarly,
when the drugless healer employs a method of treatment which is outside the scope of the system of healing which he professes to follow
and within the realm of medicine and surgery, he thereby assumes to
act as a doctor of medicine and will be held to the standard of care of
such doctor."1 This is the rule whether the healer is limited as to method
11 Swanson v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170 Pac. 135 (1918) ; Sinclair v. Haven, 198
Wash. 651, 89 P. 2d 820 (1930) ; Sears v. Lydon, 169 Wash. 92, 13 P. 2d 475 (1932) ;
Manos v. James, 7 Wn. 2d 695, 110 P. 2d 887 (1941); Cook v. Moats, 121 Neb. 769
238 N.W. 529 (1931); Mann v. Grim-Smith Hospital and Clinic, 347 Mo. 348, 147
S.W. 2d 606 (1941) ; Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114 (1905) ; Hunter v.
Hommell, 213 Cal. 677, 3 P. 2d 554 (1931).
58 134 Ore. 305, 292 Pac. 93 (1930) ; see also Henslin v. Wheaton, 91 Minn. 219,
97 N.W. 882 (1904) (negligent use of X-ray machine).
59 No case has so held, however; see Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85 S.W. 1114,
1123 (1905) ; Cazzell v. Schofield, 319 Mo. 1169, 8 S.W. 2d 580, 590 (1928) ; Foster v.
Thornton, 113 Fla. 710, 152 So. 667, 669 (1934) ; Mann v. Grim-Smith Hospital and
Clinic, 347 Mo. 348, 147 S.W. 2d 606, 608 (1941). Contra: Chesney, et al. v. People,
121 Colo. 73, 212 P. 2d 1011 (1949).
60 State v. Karsunky, 197 Wash. 87, 84 P. 2d 390 (1938) (conviction of drugless
healer for manslaughter for negligent treatment causing death).
81 Hilgedorf v. Bertschinger, 132 Ore. 641, 285 Pac. 819 (1930) (naturopath doing
surgery); Treptau v. Behrens-Spa, 247 Wis. 438, 20 N.W. 2d 108 (1945) (chiropractor bandaging foot and applying heat treatments). This rule has been carried to
great lengths, as where the courts have held that the practice of chiropractic does not
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by statute" or by the principles-of the particular school itself."8 Washington followed this rule in Brooks v. Herd,4 in which the defendant
drugless healer who employed drugs in treatment for gonorrhea, was
said to be accountable for failure to use the care and skill of the
medical practitioner in this type of treatment.
If a school of drugless healing neither treats nor professes to treat
certain human ailments, a member of such school holds himself out,
upon taking a patient, as having enough skill and knowledge to determine whether the ailment is one which his treatment would probably
relieve, and, if it is not, to so advise the patient. In such a case doctors
of medicine and surgery may give expert opinions as to the propriety
of the diagnosis by the defendant, and give evidence as to whether
there is a customary treatment that could have afforded relief to the
patient."
Since in some cases regulatory statutes have substantially affected
the law on the standard of care of the drugless healer, the statutes of
Washington will be examined for their bearing on the subject.
STATUTORY REGULATION OF DRUGLESS HEALING IN WASHINGTON

The Legislature in 1919 passed a series of separate statutes regulating the practice of medicine,"8 osteopathy, and osteopathy and surgery,"7 chiropractic," and drugless healing.6 9 The latter embraces all
authorized forms of drugless healing except osteopathy and chiropractic and will be considered in detail here.
include diagnosis, and have held a chiropractor undertaking to diagnose to the standard
of care of the doctor of medicine. Keuchler v. Volgman, 180 Wis. 238, 192 N.W. 1015
(1923) ; see Treptau v. Behrens-Spa, supra, 20 N.W. 2d at 113; Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P. 2d 654, 666 (1937). Contra: Chesney, et al. v. People, 121 Colo.
73, 212 P. 2d 1011 (1950), noted in 22 Rocry MT. L. Ry. 212 (1950) ; see Note, 17
Tax.
6 L. REV. 224.
2Walkenhorst v. Kesler, Keuchler v. Volgman, Treptau v. Behrens-Spa, note 61,

supra.
63 Hilgedorf v. Bertschinger, 132 Ore. 641, 285 Pac. 819 (1930).
64
144 Wash. 173, 257 Pac. 238 (1927).
65
Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159 (1925).
06
Wash. Laws 1919, ch. 134; REm. REv. STAT. §§ 10008 et seq. [P.P.C. §§ 734-17
et seq.]
67 Wash. Laws 1919, ch. 4; REm. REv. STAT. §§ 10056 et seq. [P.P.C. §§ 767-1
et seq.]
68 Wash. Laws 1919, ch. 5; REm. REv. STAT. §§ 10098 et seq. [P.P.C. §§ 361-1
et seq.]
09 Wash. Laws 1919, ch. 36; REar. REv. STAT. §§ 10112 et seq. [P.P.C. §§ 517-1
et seq.]
The Legislature in 1917 passed the law. regulating the practice of chiropody, the
branch of the healing arts dealing with the treatment of foot ailments. This law
authorizes the giving of drugs and performance of minor surgery, with certain limitations. Wash. Laws, 1917, ch. 38; REa. REv. STAT. §§ 10074 et seq. [P.P.C. §§ 360-1
el seq.]
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In Rem. Rev. Stat. § 10113,1 the qualifications are laid down for
admission of the drugless healer to practice. The healer must pass a
residence course of three entire sessions of thirty-six weeks at a
chartered drugless school. He must pass an examination in at least
the following subjects: anatomy, physiology, hygiene, urinalysis,
gynecology, hydrotherapy, and symptomatology. In addition he is
required to pass an examination in some or all of the following subjects,
depending upon the kind and scope of the license sought: dietetics,
radiography, electrotherapy, obstetrics, and mechanical and manual
manipulation.
Rem. Rev. Stat. § 10114"' authorizes certificates to be issued licensing the practice of specific forms of drugless healing, such as dietetics
and suggestive therapeutics, and also a certificate for any other separate and coordinate system of drugless healing which fulfills certain
requirements. It further provides that the practitioners so licensed
"shall confine their practice to the subjects and system or systems
represented by their certificate or certificates."
Rem. Rev. Stat. § 101232 sets forth various healing systems embraced by the act "for the stimulation of physiological and psychological action to establish a normal condition of mind and body, but
shall in no way include the prescribing or recommending of pharmaceutic drugs or poisons for internal use, the purpose of this act being
to confine practitioners hereunder to drugless therapeutics."
Rem. Rev. Stat. § 10124"M provides that the drugless healer shall
not use the titles of doctor of medicine and surgery, osteopathy, or
chiropractic.
Apparently the Legislature has limited the drugless healer in three
respects: (1) he may not use drugs or poisons; (2) he shall confine
his practice to the system or systems represented by his certificate;
and (3) he shall not take titles denoting practitioners of other branches
of healing.
The Supreme Court in State v. Lydon 4 added a fourth limitation.
It was held in that case that a drugless healer may not practice surgery.
The defendant, a sanipractor, was convicted of the illegal practice of
surgery for the lancing of a boil. This limitation, while not made express in the statute, is inescapably implicit in its terms, since there is
70 P.P.C. § 517-3.

P.P.C. § 517-5.
P.P.C. § 517-25.
P.P.C. § 517-27.
74 170 Wash. 354, 16 P. 2d 848 (1932).
71
72
73
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no provision for examination of the drugless healer in surgery. Furthermore, none of the systems of practice specifically mentioned in the
statute involve surgery and the drugless healer is prohibited from
taking the title of doctor of surgery."8
In 1927, the Legislature passed a further act regulating the healing
arts, known popularly as the Basic Science Act."6 This act requires, as
a prerequisite to application for a license to practice in any of the
branches of healing, the passing of an examination in five basic sciences, namely, anatomy, physiology, chemistry, pathology, and hygiene. This law is in effect in many states. Its aim was to assure that
an applicant for a license in any branch of healing had a fundamental
knowledge of the structure and working of the human body.7 7 Further
objectives were to weed out undesirables"' and to provide a single
standardby which all healers could be tested."' In Ellestad v. Swayze,"°
the Washington court (Steinert, J.) remarked, with reference to this
statute:
The five subjects named in the basic law pertain to separate and distinct
fields of science. These sciences are, in themselves, exact and universal, and
their principles operate with uniformity upon the human body, regardless
Regardless of the
of the method of healing, or treatment, employed ....
school of medicine or system of practice followed by the practitioner of
medicine in any of these systems, the general welfare of the people demands
that such practitioners be able to detect, readily, the presence of disease,
and to treat it in some manner recognized as appropriatefor its removal.81
(Italics supplied)
KELLY V. CARROLL s2 AND CAREY v. LYDON88

The Kelly Case. This case arose when K went to the office of D,
75 A question discussed in dictum in State v. Lydon, supra, note 74, at p. 364, 16 P.
2d at 851 was whether or not the drugless healer could practice surgery to the extent
required in an obstetrical case, inasmuch as the drugless healer is examined in obstetrics. In State v. Houck, 32 Wn. 2d 681, 203 P. 2d 693 (1949), the question was
answered. The defendant drugless healer was convicted in that case of practicing
medicine and surgery without a license on the ground that, in delivering a child, he
severed the umbilical cord, administered an anaesthetic, and gave an unknown drug by
injection. The conviction was affirmed.
hypodermic
76
Wash. Laws 1927, ch. 183; REm. REv. STAT. §§ 10185-1 et seq. [P.P.C. §§ 734-1
et seq.]
7 Comment, The Practice of the Healing Arts: Some Regulatory Problems, 6
FoRDHAm L. REv. 444, at 447 (1937).
78 Ibid.
79Pamphlet, Basic Science Laws, published by Bureau of Legal Medicine and
Legislation, American Medical Association, May, 1938, p. 1.
so 15 Wn. 2d 281, 130 P. 2d 349 (1942) (upholding the act against the contention
that it was unconstitutional, being arbitrary and discriminatory).
81 Idem, at 289, 290, 130 P. 2d at 353.
8236 Wn. 2d 482, 219 P. 2d 79 (1950).
83 36 Wn. 2d 878, 220 P. 2d 894 (1950) noted, 49 McH. L. Ray. 774 (1951).
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whom he knew to be a licensed drugless healer-a sanipractor--complaining of pain and muscular rigidity in his stomach. D diagnosed the
complaint as a "reaction." Over a period of twelve days, D treated K
by applying hot and cold packs, giving "sine wave" treatments (electric massages), and prescribing and administering laxatives and fruit
juices. K's condition grew more serious daily. When P, the wife of K,
begged D to call in a physician, D resisted the suggestion. After the
twelfth day, however, D advised P to call in a physician. The doctor
who was summoned diagnosed the patient's ailment as appendicitis.
The patient was near death. A large quantity of pus in the abdomen
delayed an operation, and after eight days K died. In the wrongful
death action that followed, P obtained a verdict and judgment in the
trial court. On appeal, D contended, inter alia, that the trial court
erred in refusing an instruction invoking the "school of healing" standard of care, and, further, in refusing to instruct that if the deceased
or P knew when D was employed that he belonged to a branch of the
drugless school of healing that does not practice surgery, then P could
not charge negligence in failing to advise an operation.
The Supreme Court affirmed, laying down four "basic propositions"
as the premises of its opinion: (1) a drugless healer is not a doctor; 8"
(2) drugless healers cannot qualify as expert witnesses as to matters
in the general realm of medicine and surgery; (3) drugless healers
do not belong to a school of medicine; 8" (4) one who does not have a
license to practice medicine and surgery is, nevertheless, liable for
malpractice when he assumes to act as a doctor, and is to be judged
as if he were a doctor because of those acts.
Reasoning from these principles, the court approved the trial court's
refusal to instruct on the "school of healing" standard of care, on the
basis of two rules of law which are set forth: (1) if a drugless healer
steps out of the limits of his system of practice and treats a disease
for which in the highest level of medical science there is a generally
recognized treatment (appendicitis being one of these), such interloper must be held accountable to the accepted standard of the medical
practice; (2) the "school of healing" rule as to standard of care being
84 A sanipractor is a "doctor" for the purposes of the Social Security Act, providing that those eligible for senior citizen grants shall receive medical care by a doctor
of their own choosing. Martin v. Dept. of Social Security, 12 Wn. 2d 329, 121 P. 2d

394 (1942).
85 A sanipractor would seem to be "practicing medicine," however, under the broad
definitions of "medicine" laid down by some courts. See Joyner v. State, 181 Miss.
245, 179 So. 573, 575 (1938) ; Sachs v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 300 Mass.
426, 15 N.E. 2d 473, 474 (1938).
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applicable only as between doctors, it cannot be invoked in favor of
a drugless healer.
The negligence on which liability was predicated by the court was
the failure of the defendant to advise other treatment when he knew
or should have known that his method was ineffectual. 6 As a proximate
result of this neglect, proper treatment, i. e., an operation, was delayed
until it was too late to save the patient. The Supreme Court denied
D's contention that these facts would not warrant a recovery if P or
K knew when treatment was begun that D was a drugless healer who
would not operate. The court held that the patient does not assume
the risk of the drugless healer's ineffectual treatment, although the
healer acts in accordance with the principles of his own school. The
relation of trust and confidence between healer and patient imposes a
duty upon the healer to cease his treatment and to advise the patient
to seek other relief whenever the healer knows or should know that his
own course of treatment is ineffectual.
The Carney Case. P, a victim of diabetes, went to D, a licensed
drugless healer, for treatment. D informed her that he could treat
diabetes without the aid of insulin or drugs. He prescribed a diet for
P and gave instructions as to the taking of baths. After forty-one
treatments, P's condition had greatly deteriorated. In the malpractice
action that followed, after a verdict for P, the trial court rendered a
judgment n.o.v., basing its judgment on the case of Fritz v. Horsfall 7
The rule of that case is that negligence of a regularmedical practitioner
is not established where doctors of "equal skill and learning" disagree
as to the propriety of the defendant's method of treatment. In such
a case the jury will not be allowed to accept the opinion that the
defendant's methods were improper and reject the contrary opinion.
The trial court held that the same rule applied, by analogy, to all
practitioners of the healing arts.
The Supreme Court reversed and ordered judgment on the verdict,
holding that "the analogy does not apply to a drugless healer because
he is restricted by statute to that which is permitted him under the
license issued to him.""8 The c6urt further held, citing the Kelly case,
that when the drugless healer knows or should know that his method
88 Though the facts indicate that the defendant may have made an erroneous diagnosis, and that he may have acted improperly in prescribing laxatives and foods, the
court does not base its holding on these possible theories of negligence, presumably
because these acts were not proximate causes of the patient's death.
8724 Wn. 2d 14, 163 P. 2d 148 (1945).
88 Carney v. Lydon, at 880, 220 P. 2d at 895.
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of treatment is not of a character productive of reasonable success, it
is his duty to cease and advise his patient to seek other relief. The
court did not indicate the standard of care against which the healer's
conduct was tested under this rule. It stated merely that the jury could
have found the defendant negligent under the evidence in the case.
The Rules of the Two Cases. The holdings of the two cases may be
summarized thus:
(1) The "school of healing" standard is not applicable to drugless
healers (the Kelly case).
(2) If the drugless healer undertakes to treat a disease for which,
in the highest level of medical science, there is a generally recognized
treatment then the drugless healer steps out of his limits and will be
held to the standard of care of the reasonably skilled and trained doctor
of medicine and surgery (Kelly case).
(3) When the drugless healer knows or should know that his method
of treatment is not of a character productive of reasonable success, it
is his duty to cease and to advise his patient to seek other relief (the
Kelly and Carney cases). The healer may be found negligent under
this rule, although the patient knows that such healer belongs to a
school of drugless healing which will not use nor advise the kind of
treatment which it is contended should have been given or advised
(the Kelly case).
(4) When healers of equal skill and learning, and of the defendant's
own school of healing, express contrary opinions in a malpractice case
as to the necessity or propriety of the defendant drugless healer's
methods of treatment, the jury may, nevertheless, find the defendant
negligent by accepting the opinions of those healers expressing disapproval of the defendant's methods and rejecting the opposing
opinions (the Carney case).
Applicability of the "School of Healing" Rule to Drugless Healers;
Confusion in the Cases. The court in the Kelly case states that the
"school of healing" standard is only applicable as between doctors
who are of "equal skill and learning." "Their [drugless healers'] qualities are so far inferior to those of a doctor that the law will conclusively
presume that they are not upon terms of equality which would entitle
their opinions to cancel out the best medical opinion available." 89
This holding is against all authority. The "school of healing" standard has never been understood, in Washington or elsewhere, to apply
89 Kelly v. Carroll, at 495, 219 P. 2d at 86.
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to physicians and surgeons alone. On the contrary, as has been shown,
cases involving conflict between recognized schools of medicine and
drugless healing have been frequent and uniform occasions for the
invocation of the rule. Corey v. Radabaugh," not mentioned in,
the
Kelly opinion, was an express holding that the rule was applicable to
a drugless healer, and must be considered as overruled sub silentio.
The facts of the Kelly case bring it within none of the recognized exceptions to the "school of healing" rule which have been discussed.
A possible explanation of the court's holding on this question is the
confusion by the court of the "school of healing" rule with the rule of
the Horsfall case, which was held inapplicable to drugless healers in
the Carney case. The Horsfall rule was first laid down in Dahl v.
Wagner,9 a malpractice case in which a regular medical practitioner
was the defendant. In that case the court said, "... where doctors of
equal skill and learning express contrary opinions upon admitted facts
and such opinions differ, although not preponderating one way or the
other.., the law will not impose a liability upon a professional man
who acts within the reasonable limits of either opinion."9 2 All of the
expert witnesses in that case were apparently doctors and of the same
school of medicine as the defendant. "In such a case, the court must
hold that there is nothing upon which the jury may pass, the reason
being that the jury may not be allowed to accept one theory to the
exclusion of another."9
This rule, while similar on its surface to the "school of healing" rule,
is in substance very different. It has been applied only in cases in which
the defendants were doctors of medicine and surgery, and, with the
one exception discussed below, to cases in which the defendants and
all medical witnesses were of the same school of medicine. It has
reference, not to a conflict between schools of healing, but to differences
of opinion within a single school. The rule of the Dahl and Horsfall
cases is a species of the rule that a doctor will not be held liable for
malpractice if he uses one of two or more accepted and customary
methods of treatment. It is not a rule on standard of care at all. In none
of the cases in which the rule was applied was it contended that the
standard of care was other than the "standard of medical practice in
90 See note 50 and related text, supra.

9187 Wash. 492, 151 Pac. 1079 (1915).
12Id., at 495, 151 Pac. at 1080.
93 Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wn. 2d 14, 17, 163 P. 2d 148, 150 (1945). See also Peddicord v. Leiser, 5 Wn. 2d 190, 105 P. 2d 5 (1940), noted 17 WASH. L. REv. 118 (1942);
Dishman v. Northern Pacific Benefit Assn., 96 Wash. 182, 164 Pac. 943 (1917).
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the community."9 The rule merely states when that standard has, as
a matter of law, been attained. That standard has been met if doctors
of "equal skill and learning" disagree in their testimony as to the
necessity or propriety of the defendant's acts. If this occurs, the rule
requires that a nonsuit or directed verdict for the defendant be granted.
If it be contended that these "disagreeing" doctors are members of
separate "schools of medicine," each with its own standard of care, the
answer is that these are not "schools" as that term is generally under-

stood. And the rule of the Dahl and Horsfall cases does not bar doctors from testifying as to the propriety of the treatment by a physician
whose methods they disapprove; nor has the rule ever been held to
embody a standardof care to be applied by a jury.
The confusion of the rule of the Dahl and Horsfall cases had its
inception in the case of Ennis v. Banks,"5 already discussed in another
connection. That case involved a conflict of opinion between allopathic
and homeopathic physicians as to the propriety of the method of
treatment used by the defendant, an allopath. Both schools were recognized branches of medicine and surgery. On appeal from a judgment
on a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant contended, inter alia, that
the court erred in instructing the jury that the defendant would be
liable if he did not follow the practice "followed by other physicians
in good standing." The Supreme Court, in reversing, held that "each
school of medicine is entitled to practice in its own way, and because
one does not use the methods of the other is no reason for holding the
one for malpractice." The opinion cites the case of Dahl v. Wagner
in support of this holding. It might thus be construed to apply either
the rule of that case or the "school of healing" rule. It would seem
that only the latter was logically applicable to the case. What was
decided was that the issue of negligence was submitted to the jury
under an incorrect instruction as to standard of care, not that the
defendant had, as a matter of law, met the requirements of any
standard.
The court in the Kelly case renewed the confusion of the rules when
it cited not only the Ennis, but also the Dahl and Horsfall cases for
the "school of healing" rule, and referred to that rule as being applicable only as between doctors of "equal skill and learning."
The denial of the "school of healing" standard to the drugless healer
94 Fritz v. Horsfall, supra note 93 at 17, 163 P. 2d at 150. See other cases cited
in note 93.
95 95 Wash. 513, 164 Pac. 58 (1917).
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in the Kelly case must be distinguished from the holding of the Carney
case lest these cases also be confused. Since the court in the Carney
case refused to apply the rule of the Dahl and Horsfall cases to a
drugless healer, its holding must be that, in the case of such practitioner, negligence may be established despite a conflict of opinion
among healers of equal skill and learning and of the same school of
healing as the defendant as to the propriety of the defendant's acts.
It lays down no rule on standard of care and is not, in fact, logically
in point in any discussion limited to that subject. It is mentioned here
only because it might, in view of the confusion discussed, be construed
to embody some rule on this subject.
Abandonment of the School of Healing Standard; Statutory Basis.
The Washington statutes regulating drugless healing might be looked
to for support for the abandonment of the "school of healing" standard
in its application to the drugless healer. The Utah case of Walkenhorst
v. Kesler, 8 cited in the Kelly case, held the "school of healing" standard inapplicable to a chiropractor on the ground that the regulatory
statute did not recognize a division of the healing arts into "schools of
healing." The court pointed out that chiropractors and practitioners
of medicine and surgery were both provided for in the same statute,
and that the chiropractor was required to pass an examination nearly
as difficult as that of the doctor of medicine. The court in the Kelly
case did not say that the defendant's line of practice was not a separate
and distinct "school of healing." Further, a separate statute governs
the drugless healer in this state, if that fact is significant.
The examinations required in this state of the drugless healer, discussed above, are nearly as comprehensive as those required of physicians. The Court seems to indicate at one point in the Kelly case that
study in the basic sciences and other subjects not strictly pertinent to
their systems of practice was required in order that drugless healers
would know what they must not treat-to recognize the situations in
which their limited methods were insufficient and the treatment of a
doctor of medicine required. 7 If this principle were followed, then the
drugless healer following the methods of his own school with reasonable skill would not necessarily be secured against liability for malpractice. The principle is in line with the professed aim of the Basic
Science Act to provide a common standard against which all healers
could be tested.
96 92 Utah 312, 67 P. 2d 654 (1937).
07

p. 492, 219 P. 2d at 85.
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The difficulties of such principle, however, are two: (1) drugless
healers are not required to study the subjects of medicine and surgery;
(2) such healers are authorized to practice the healing arts according
to the principles and techniques of their own schools. It seems rather
anomalous to hold that the drugless healer, having passed the examination requirements and having been issued a certificate to minister to
the afflicted by the limited methods of his own school, is required in
his practice to recognize the superiority in certain instances of methods
of treatment of which he is required to have no knowledge. If it could
be said that a knowledge of the basic sciences erases doubts as to what
methods of treating the various human ailments are or are not
"proper," then the proposition could perhaps be maintained. It could
with reason be said that the provisions for examination of drugless
healers in symptomatology, urinalysis, and the basic sciences imposes
upon the drugless healer the same standard of care in detecting and
diagnosing disease as is possessed by the doctor. 8 But as to the proper
methods of treating certain diseases, once diagnosed, apparently even
doctors of medicine disagree. Furthermore, the various statutes regulating the healing arts in Washington in themselves amount to a recognition that various methods of treating human ailments are "proper."
It is submitted that the imposition on the drugless healer of a standard
of care other than that of his own line of practice finds no support in
the statutes.
Abandonment of the "School of Healing" Standard; Meaning and
Effects. Recognizing that a new or different rule is not necessarily a
bad rule, the meaning and implications of the holding of the Kelly case
that the "school of healing" standard is inapplicable to the drugless
healer remains to be considered. The "school of healing" standard being abandoned, what is substituted in its stead? In the Kelly case it
was unnecessary to decide the question of what standard of care would
be applicable to the drugless healer where the disease treated is not
one for which there is a generally recognized treatment in medicine
or surgery. In such a case, the standard of care of the drugless healer
must, it is submitted, be one of three alternatives: (1) the standard
of care of the doctor of medicine and surgery; (2) the standard of
care of the "reasonably prudent man"; or (3) the standard of the
98 This would not seem proper, however, if certain methods of diagnosis were not
open to the drugless healer. For example, it might be held that the giving of a blood
test, involving the piercing of the skin with a needle, is practicing surgery. See Op.
Att'y Gen. (1939-1940), p. 301.
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average or ordinary practitioner of the healing arts in all its branches.
If the drugless healer is held to the standard of care of the doctor of
medicine, then the expert opinions of members of the defendant's own
school of healing as to the propriety of his acts would be excluded.
Drugless healers, having been licensed under statute to practice by
their own methods, would in effect be reduced to the status of the
practitioners of nonrecognized branches of the healing arts. They
would be considered as laymen assuming to act as doctors. By holding
the drugless healers in all cases to the standard of the doctor of medicine, the court would accomplish the same result, in malpractice cases,
as would be effected by a repeal of the drugless healing statute and a
prohibition of any type of healing without a license to practice medicine or surgery.
Supposing the standard of care to be that of the "reasonably prudent
man," the drugless healer would be placed in the same status as the
person of the ordinary business or calling. The standard of the calling,
i. e., drugless healing, could be proved and also the fact that the drugless healer had attained that standard. Practitioners of other branches
of healing, including schools of medicine and surgery, would also be
competent to give expert opinions on the propriety of the defendant's
methods, so long as those branches of healing were recognized as competent to treat the particular human ailments in question." However,
the fact that the defendant used methods proper by the standards of
his own school of healing, or of all schools of healing, would not be
conclusive on the issue of negligence. The jury would be permitted to
find the defendant negligent though his acts were proper by the
standards of all schools. Such a rule would overlook the considerations
underlying the rule that the recognized branches of the healing arts
may fix their respective standards of care. The reason of that rule, as
has been pointed out, is that juries do not have sufficient understanding
of the healing arts to render an intelligent verdict on the basis of a
general standard of reasonableness. While that principle may not
apply with the same force to the drugless schools of healing as it does
to the schools of medicine and surgery, it would, nevertheless, seem
undesirable to permit a jury to find a defendant negligent when his
method of treatment is approved by all branches of healing.
09 This is the probable result, in view of the Kelly opinion at p. 491, 219 P. 2d at
85, where the court states that the doctor of medicine, because of his unlimited license,
may give testimony in the entire field of healing. If the "school of healing" rule is
abandoned, it would seem there is no bar to the testimony of the doctor of medicine.
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Finally, the standard of care of the drugless healer could be held to
be that of the average or ordinary practitioner of the healing arts in
all of its branches. If, as a matter of fact, the branch of drugless healing
involved in the particular case is not a "school of healing" distinct
from any other group practicing the healing arts, such a rule would
be proper. Such, however, is not the case. A drugless healer, whatever
his system, appears to be at least in a "school of healing" distinct from
that of the doctor of medicine and surgery. Considerations of the unfairness of testing the drugless healer's treatment by the standards of
other schools aside, there is still the difficulty of applying this standard
of care. The jury would presumably be instructed that the standard is
that of the average or ordinarily skilled and trained practitioner of the
healing arts in all its branches. The jury, then, would not only have
to visualize an "average healer" within a single school, but would also
have to compound such mythical person with the average practitioner
in each of the other schools whose principles were introduced as bearing on the reasonableness of the defendant's acts, then determine
whether the defendant attained the standard of this tortuously conceived hybrid known as "the average healer." It is doubtful whether
such a course is any more consistent with the capacity and understanding of the lay jury than is the application of the standard of the "reasonably prudent man" in malpractice cases.
Treatment of Diseases for Which There Is a Generally Recognized
Medical or Surgical Treatment. The holding of the Kelly case that
the drugless healer who undertakes to treat a disease for which there
is a generally recognized treatment is held to the standard of care of
the doctor of medicine in such treatment is based upon the "basic
propositions" laid down by the court. These propositions are that the
drugless healer is not a doctor and cannot qualify as an expert witness
in the general realm of medicine and surgery; when he assumes to act
as a doctor he is to be judged by the standard of such practitioner.
Conceding the correctness of these premises, it is submitted that the
holding of the court does not follow. It is supported neither by case
authority nor by the statutes regulating drugless healing. None of the
cases cited in the opinion support the holding."' There is no express
100 The court cites the case of Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228
(1888) ; this case deals with the criteria for recognition of a branch of healing as an
established school (see note 15 and text, supra) and would not seem to be in point.
The court also cites the case of Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P. 2d 654
(1937) (see notes 61 and 96 and related text, supra). This case deals with the drugless
healer who uses methods outside the scope of his school of healing, and with the rule
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or implied limitation either by statute or by the principles of the particular school of healing involved in the Kelly case as to the kind of
diseases which the drugless healer of the defendant's school may
properly treat. Thus, it would seem that such drugless healer may
treat any human ailment without stepping into the general field of
medicine and surgery. The three limitations on the drugless healer
made express in the statute, plus the limitation engrafted thereon by
the court in State v. Lydon, would seem to be exclusive. The holding of
the Kelly case that upon treating certain human ailments the drugless
healer invades the field of medicine and surgery would lead logically
to the astonishing result that the drugless healer could be prosecuted
for practice of medicine or surgery without a license if he undertook
to treat a disease for which there was a generally recognized medical
treatment. It is interesting to note that the court on another occasion
approved the following definition of the drugless healer:
. .

any person who practices .

.

. the treatment of any ailment, disease,

defect or disability of the human body by manipulation, adjustment, manual

or electrotherapy or by any similar method. (Italics supplied)o1 0

What diseases are embraced in the phrase "disease for which there
is in the highest realm of medical science a generally recognized treatment?" If there is a wide difference of opinion among physicians as to
the proper treatment for the particular human ailment involved, apparently this rule would be inapplicable. The drugless healer must,
then, when he takes a patient, not only ascertain the nature of the
patient's ailment and whether there is a medical or surgical treatment
for it, but must also determine whether any medical or surgical treatment for such disease is "generally recognized." If he does not do so,
and the disease proves to be one that is embraced within the abovestated rule, then the fact that he used the care and skill of the ordinary member of his own line of practice will avail him nothing if his
treatment results in injury and a malpractice suit. The Kelly case
would require him to advise medical treatment in such a situation.
On the other hand, the rule might be construed to embrace diseases
for which there are several proper methods of medical or surgical
treatment. If such is the meaning of the rule, then the drugless healer
finds himself in the unhappy position of treating at his peril any disease
to be applied where the regulatory statutes of the jurisdiction do not recognize distinct
schools of healing. It is not concerned with the question of what hiuntan ailnents may
be properly treated by the drugless healer.
101 State v. Houck, 32 Wn. 2d 681, 691, 203 P. 2d 693, 699 (1949).
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for which there is any cure in medicine or surgery. That is, the drugless
healer may with reasonable safety treat only those diseases for which
medicine and surgery have no cure.
The Healer's Duty to Advise Other Treatment. The holdings of the
Kelly and Carney cases that a drugless healer has a duty to advise his
patient to seek other relief when he knows or should know that his
own course of treatment is ineffectual, are in line with the general
rule.1 °2 The corollary of this rule is that the patient does not "assume
the risk" of ineffective and deleterious treatment. The patient, however, does assume some risks of ineffective treatment. The duty to
advise other treatment is not absolute. The healer has this duty only
when he knows or should know that his own treatment is ineffectual.
Again the inquiry is as to the standard of care to which the healer will
be held in determining when his own method of treatment is not of a
character productive of reasonable success. The cases do not indicate
that a practitioner of one branch of healing is held to a standard of
care other than that of his own school in determining that his own
method of treatment is ineffective. The general rule is that a patient
selecting for treatment a branch of healing which does not use certain
methods may not complain if such methods are not employed or advised. This is merely another way of stating the "school of healing"
rule. It thus appears that the patient at least "assumes the risk" of the
healer's lack of skill and knowledge in schools of healing other than
his own.
The Kelly case, however, consistent with its abandonment of the
"school of healing" standard, would test the neglect or fulfillment of
the admitted duty of the healer to advise other treatment when his
own is ineffectual, not against the standard of the defendant's own
school of healing, but against that of the doctor of medicine or some
other standard. The same remarks could be made in reference to" this
holding as were made in connection with the holding that the "school
of healing" standard is inapplicable to drugless healers. 103
Liability for Malpractice When Expert Witnesses Disagree; the
Carney Case. As pointed out above, the holding of the Carney case
lays down no standard of care for the drugless healer. The rule of that
case is that when healers of "equal skill and learning" and of the
102 Logan v. Field, 75 Mo. App. 594, 90 S.W. 127 (1898) ; Evedt v. Haugen, 70
N. D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940); Wambold v. Brock, 236 Iowa 758, 19 N.W. 2d 582
(1945) ; 41 A-m. JUR., Physicians and Surgeons, § 73; 132 A.L.R. 392.
102 See text, supra, concerning "Abandonment of School of Healing Standard."
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defendant's own school express contrary opinions as to the necessity
or propriety of the defendant's acts, the jury is not precluded from
finding the defendant negligent by accepting the opinions of the experts who disapprove of such acts and rejecting the opposing views.
As pointed out in a previous article in this journal,"0 4 the effect of
the rule of the Dahl and Horsfall cases has been to require, for a recovery in malpractice actions against a physician, a virtual unanimity
of opinion among practitioners of the defendant's own line of practice
that the defendant's methods of treatment were improper. Thus the
rule goes further than those absolving the defendant from liability for
malpractice when he uses one of two or more accepted and customary
methods of treatment, or when his method of treatment has the approval of a "respectable minority of the medical profession.""' 5 The
rule of the Dahl and Horsfall cases is that whenever there is a disagreement in the testimony of doctors as to the propriety of the defendant's
treatment, as distinguished from a like conflict among doctors generally, conclusively established by testimony, the case may not be
allowed to go to the jury. It would seem that where the variance is
merely in the testimony, the jury should be permitted to reach a verdict on the issue of negligence by the usual process of weighing the
evidence on either side, considering the bias, training, and credibility
of the various expert witnesses.' It is submitted that the court in the
Carney case reached a sound result in refusing to extend, by analogy,
the rule of the Dahl and Horsfall cases, to drugless healers.
Further, since the "school of healing" standard has been abandoned
in its application to the drugless healer, the rule of the Dahl and
Horsfall cases would not seem applicable to such healer in any event.
The latter rule, as applied to doctors of medicine, presupposes the
application of the standard of the medical practice, i. e., the standard
of the defendant's own school. It provides that that standard has been
attained, as a matter of law, when doctors of "equal skill and learning"
and of the defendant's own school disagree as to the necessity or
propriety of the defendant's professional acts. The application of such
rule to drugless healers, whose negligence may be determined by
reference to the customary and accepted practices of healers of different schools, and who are not "of equal skill and learning," would be
obviously inappropriate.
104 Note, 17 WAsH. L. Rnv. 118.
105

See cases cited in note 31, supra.

108 See note, op. cit., supra, note 104.
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CONCLUSIONS

The theme of the Kelly case, and to a lesser extent the Carney case
also, is that drugless healers, because of their limited methods and
qualifications, are dangerous as presently regulated and must be more
strictly and firmly dealt with."' The validity of this contention is
beyond the scope of discussion in this article.
If the policy of the state toward drugless healers is what the Kelly
case would indicate,"0 ' it is submitted that the proper remedy does
not lie in holding the drugless healer in malpractice cases to a standard
of care other than that of his own school of healing. The "school of
healing" rule is based on valid considerations of fairness and expediency. Nor does the proper remedy lie in placing vague extrastatutory
limitations on the kinds of human ailments which the drugless healer
may properly treat. The state, through its legislature, has set out
what it has deemed proper to govern the practice of drugless healing
and placed its stamp of approval on the practice as so regulated. The
court, against such authority and also against judicial precedent in
Washington and elsewhere, has proceeded to lay down rules for malpractice cases which would make the exercise of the statutory authority
to practice drugless healing inordinately perilous. The result of the
Kelly case may appeal to one's "sense of equity"; this does not justify
the broad rules laid down.
If it is the policy of the state to deal more strictly with the practice
of drugless healing, then that policy should be made articulate in a
revision of the statute. It would seem neither wise nor just to have the
legislature and the courts at odds on a matter of so vital concern to
the public as the healing arts. The specific danger which appeared to
trouble the court in the Kelly case was the treatment of certain serious
diseases by the drugless healer. A partial solution to this problem is
107 The controversial subject of the merits of the various branches of the healing
arts would seem to be neither a usual nor proper subject of judicial fiat. "The law
recognizes that there are different schools of medicine, but it does not favor one recognized school to the exclusion of others." Floyd v. Michie, 11 S.W. 2d 657, 659 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
108 "The appellant's theory that a drugless healer is licensed to treat all human
maladies, and must be exonerated from all liability on his part, if he resorts only to
the particular methods of his cult for determining the nature of diseases and the remedies therefor, no matter how serious the consequences, cannot be entertained. That
proposition, if accepted as true, would contravene a sound public policy. ...
It would
render the legislature's exercise of the police power meaningless and ineffectual in
requiring licenses for the treatment of human maladies. The essence of its purpose is
to eliminate incompetent persons from holding themselves out to treat the public. A
rule of caveat patiens would defeat such a purpose." Kelly v. Carroll, at p. 492, 219
P. 2d at 85.
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suggested by a Wisconsin statute prohibiting certain classes of drugless
practitioners from treating "any specific disease" except upon the
advice of a physician.' If the danger from the drugless healer is
greater than his utility, an available remedy is a repeal of the statute
authorizing the practice of drugless healing and the prohibition of
practice of the healing arts by any method without a license.'"

109 Vis. STAT. 1949 § 147.185. Washington has by statute limited the kinds of
human ailments which may be properly treated by a chiropodist. REI . REV. STAT.
§ 10074 [P.P.C. § 360-1].
110 If this were done, the unlicensed drugless healer would be held in a malpractice
case to the standard of care of those who offered treatment lawfully, i.e., the practitioners of medicine and surgery. Epstein v. Hirschon, 33 N. Y. Supp. 2d 83 (1942).
Massachusetts has adopted the rule that an unlicensed chiropractor is guilty of negligence per se whenever his treatment results in injury; under the rule there obtaining
it need not be shown that negligence caused the injury. Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261
Mass. 40, 158 N.E. 270, 57 A.L.R. 974 (1927) ; but see Deward v. Whitney, 298 Mass.
41, 9 N.E. 2d 369, 371 (1937).

